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Introduction
Political science has developed a fairly good understanding of the political economy
of democracy. Extant research suggests that democracies grow faster (Acemoglu
et al., 2014; Gerring et al., 2005), provide more public services (Lake and Baum,
2001), reach higher levels of human development (Gerring et al., 2012; Ross, 2006,
for a contrary view), compensate more for losses stemming from trade liberaliza-
tion (Rudra and Haggard, 2005), and are more equal (Reuveny and Li, 2003) than
autocracies. Far less is know about the political economy of democratization. De-
mocratization is not simply democracy to a lesser degree. Rather, it is the non-linear,
non-deterministic process towards it, which introduces new political incentives and
institutional constraints, often in sequence, not simultaneously, and sometimes with
countervailing eﬀects. This, in turn, gives democratizing regimes speciﬁc character-
istics  a fact that has been under-appreciated in the literature (a notable exception
is Son, 2015). In this article, we seek to uncover these characteristics in the context
of political budget cycles.
Political budget cycles (PBCs) designate periodic ﬂuctuations in ﬁscal policies
induced by the cycle of elections (Alt and Rose, 2009, 845). Recent research implies
that democratization has a non-linear eﬀect on PBCs: positive at the autocratic end
of the regime spectrum; negative at the democratic end. In this article, we the-
oretically develop and empirically test this non-linear eﬀect. First, we argue that
democratization is (at the very least) a two-dimensional process, involving the intro-
duction of more substantial constraints on executive powers (executive constraints),
and an intensiﬁcation of the struggle for power (political competition). The two have
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reverse eﬀects on PBCs: the ﬁrst reduces incumbents' ability to create PBCs; the sec-
ond increases their incentive. Second, we argue that while relatively unconstrained
executive powers and some degree of political competition are necessary conditions,
it is the fear of losing elections (electoral competitiveness) that triggers PBCs. If in-
cumbents are conﬁdent of their re-election, they do not create PBCs. Third, we show
that because of the empirical covariation between executive constraints and political
competition along the regime spectrum, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes. In
most autocracies, there is no incentive; in most advanced democracies, incumbents
do not have the ability to create PBCs.1 As a result, the observed (aggregate) eﬀect
of democratization is non-linear: positive at the autocratic end of the regime spec-
trum, where the ﬂuctuations are driven by rising levels of political competition and
triggered by electoral uncertainty; negative at the democratic end, where they are
contained by the growing number of constraints on executive powers.
We test this argument against data on public spending in 112 countries, cov-
ering the entire regime spectrum over the period from 1960 to 2006. The dataset
partly draws on reports from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) statistical
oﬃce and documents from the Fund's archives. It signiﬁcantly improves on exist-
ing data by extending it back in time and including more observations, particularly
from the autocratic end of the regime spectrum. Like Rogoﬀ (1990) and others, we
1 We recognise the ﬁndings of Alt and Lassen (2006), Streb et al. (2009), and others,
suggesting that in some democracies, incumbents do have the ability, provided
there is little ﬁscal transparency (Alt and Lassen, 2006) or few parliamentary veto
players and little compliance with budget laws (Streb et al., 2009).
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focus on spending rather than revenues or debt.2 Our empirical ﬁndings support the
theoretical argument: incumbents are more likely to create PBCs when (1) their
decision-making powers are relatively unconstrained, (2) multiple parties compete
for power in a system that allows incumbency defeat, and (3) win-margins in the
last elections were relatively small. In addition, we demonstrate that executive con-
straints and political competition covary along the regime spectrum and that, as a
result, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes.
The article contributes to the PBC literature in three ways. First, it proﬀers
a more nuanced understanding of the eﬀect of democratization by pointing to the
multiple dimensions of democratization and their countervailing eﬀects on PBCs.
Second, it empirically demonstrates the non-linear eﬀect of democratization that
has been implied in the PBC literature. Third, it is the most comprehensive study
of PBCs to date covering the entire range of regimes, from full autocracies to full
democracies.
The article proceeds as follows. In the following two sections, we develop our
argument by reviewing the PBC literature, introducing our two-dimensional con-
ceptualization of democratization, and discussing the eﬀect of democratization on
PBCs. We then deﬁne our variables, describe our estimation strategy, present the
ﬁndings, and carry out robustness tests. Finally, we draw conclusions and propose
areas of future research.
2 We also assume that voters value the goods and services that public spending
provides, not that expenditures are used to boost economic growth.
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Democratization and PBCs
Democratization has important political economy implications. It has been shown to
aﬀect growth (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001) and to condition the eﬀect of inequality
on growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1994). We also know that it fosters trade (Milner
and Kubota, 2005) and capital account liberalization (Mukherjee et al., 2014; Milner
and Mukherjee, 2009); contributes to economic stability (Rodrik, 2000); and stimu-
lates social spending (Ross, 2006). But what is its eﬀect on PBCs? The literature
does not give a clear answer. However, it does oﬀer three arguments that link de-
mocratization to PBCs: two that have to do with the incumbents; one that has to
do with the voters.
The ﬁrst argument is that stronger checks and balances reduce the incumbent's
ability to create PBCs. This argument can be traced back to the Rogoﬀ model,
which assumes that incumbents control spending. If not, or if the incumbent only
partially controls spending, PBCs are less likely to occur. In one of the ﬁrst studies
of PBCs outside Western Europe and North America, Schuknecht (1996, 158) notes
that in developing countries, checks and balances are often little developed and the
incumbent government has signiﬁcant monetary and budgetary discretion. We should
therefore expect election-oriented behavior by governments in developing countries
to be quite pronounced and straightforward. Consistent with the argument, he
ﬁnds large PBCs in developing countries. In a similar vein, more recent studies
have focused on diﬀerent types of checks and balances: legislative veto players and
compliance with ﬁscal laws (Streb et al., 2009, 427), ﬁscal transparency and party
polarization (Alt and Lassen, 2006), party institutionalization (Shelton, 2014), and
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the checks and balances produced by presidential systems (Persson and Tabellini,
2003b). Some of the studies link the argument to democratization (e.g., Shelton,
2014). However, most suggest that in the absence of checks and balances, PBCs
occur even in advanced democracies (Streb et al., 2009; Alt and Lassen, 2006).
The second argument is that political competition increases the incumbent's in-
centive to create PBCs. The Rogoﬀ model generally assumes elections are compet-
itive. However, Rogoﬀ (1990, 34) himself, questions whether PBC theory has any
bearing on countries such as Mexico and Japan, in which a single party dominates po-
litical life?3 Testing the argument precisely in the case of Mexico, Gonzalez (2002)
ﬁnds that the spending ﬂuctuations have been largest during the country's most
democratic periods. She attributes this to the bigger threat for the ruling party to
lose power (Gonzalez, 2002, 221). Block, Ferree, and Singh (2003) test the argument
in a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries. They ﬁnd that PBCs occur only when
elections are competitive and conclude that incumbents' incentive to create PBCs
in nascent democracies is strong, but contingent on multiparty competition (Block
et al., 2003, 462). Vergne (2009) tests the argument in developing countries more
broadly and ﬁnds similar patterns. She also ﬁnds that the spending ﬂuctuations are
largest in founding elections, when incumbents have an incentive to deter the entry
of future challengers (Vergne, 2009, 74).
3 Rogoﬀ concludes that it does, arguing that even in dominant-party systems, the
country's leaders still generally care about their party's margin of victory (Rogoﬀ,
1990, 34). While we do not disagree, we argue that the incentive is still stronger
when incumbents fear losing.
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The third argument linking democratization to PBCs is that voter experience and
information reduces the incumbent's ability to create PBCs. This argument can also
be traced back to the Rogoﬀ model, which assumes asymmetric information. If in-
formation were symmetric, voters would not reward the incumbent for the spending
increases and the incumbent would not have an incentive to create PBCs. Brender
and Drazen (2005; 2007) explicitly link the information asymmetries to democratiza-
tion. In their study, they ﬁnd that the PBCs are larger in new democracies, where
voters are inexperienced with electoral politics or may simply lack the information
needed to evaluate ﬁscal manipulation (Brender and Drazen, 2005, 1273).4 Testing
the argument in a new democracy, Russia, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) ﬁnd
that the cycles have become smaller over time and that this is consistent with the
view that voters and independent media learn as democracy matures (Akhmedov
and Zhuravskaya, 2004, 1334). Shi and Svensson (2006) also emphasize information
in their study. However, they suggest that in the absence of information, PBCs
occur even in advanced democracies, echoing the ﬁndings of Alt and Lassen (2006)
and Streb et al. (2009) regarding the eﬀect of legislative veto players and compliance
4 Their dataset contains 108 countries. However, they exlude observations with a
Polity score below 0, leaving them with 68 democracies. It should be noted that
the Polity threshold for full democracies is usually 6. Countries with a Polity score
between -6 and 6 are considered anocracies.
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with ﬁscal laws, and of ﬁscal transparency and party polarization.5
What is then the aggregate eﬀect of democratization on PBCs? Careful reading
of the literature implies that it is non-linear: positive at the autocratic end of the
regime spectrum; negative at the democratic end. Brender and Drazen (2005; 2007),
for example, exclude observations with a Polity score below 0, i.e; observations in the
autocratic half of the regime spectrum, stating that manipulating spending before
elections only makes sense in countries in which elections are competitive (Brender
and Drazen, 2005, 1274). Therefore, although they ﬁnd a containing eﬀect of de-
mocratization, their study actually implies a non-linear eﬀect, peaking in countries
with a Polity score around 0.6 Shi and Svensson (2006) do not exclude observations
but recognize that in situations where political rights are restricted and voting out-
comes can be manipulated, elections need not trigger a change in ﬁscal policy (Shi
and Svensson, 2006, 1384). Their ﬁndings, therefore, also imply a non-linear eﬀect
along the regime spectrum: positive at the autocratic end, although not necessarily
negative at the democratic end. Finally, Vergne (2009)'s ﬁnding that the spend-
ing ﬂuctuations are largest in founding elections and that they disappear as there is
5 Shi and Svensson (2006) also outline another mechanisms, namely that checks and
balances reduce the incumbent's ability to extract rents and therefore her incentive
to create PBCs. This argument is in line with the foregoing discussion of executive
constraints and incentives.
6 Streb, Lema, and Torrens (2009) also exclude observations with a Polity score below
0.
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more experience with elections, also suggests a non-linear eﬀect of democratization.7
The literature suﬀers from two major shortcomings. First, it consist of either
single-country studies that test the eﬀect of democratization across time or across
sub-national units (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Gonzalez, 2002) or cross-
country studies that test the eﬀect across a limited number of countries, usually
at the democratic end of the regime spectrum (Brender and Drazen, 2005, 2007;
Vergne, 2009).8 As a result, the democracy variable varies very little and the eﬀect of
democratization is tested only within very narrow parameters. This is problematic,
when, as we argue and the literature suggests, the eﬀect of democratization is non-
linear along the regime spectrum. Demonstrating this requires observations from the
entire regime spectrum.
The second shortcoming is that the literature is based on one-dimensional concep-
tualizations of democratization, measured either dichotomously (Shi and Svensson,
2006; Shelton, 2014; Brender and Drazen, 2005, 2007; Streb et al., 2009) or by the
number of competitive elections held in a country (Brender and Drazen, 2005, 2007;
Vergne, 2009). While one-dimensional conceptualizations and dichotomous measures
7 Vergne (2009)'s ﬁnding that the cycles disappear as countries gain more experience
with elections only applies to PBCs in aggregate spending. In fact, one of her main
ﬁndings is the PBCs endure in disaggregate spending, more speciﬁcally current
expenditures.
8 This critique has been also been voiced by Shi and Svensson (2006), who include
a few countries from the autocratic half such as Egypt and Syria; and by Persson
and Tabellini (2003b).
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may provide some initial guidance regarding the eﬀect of democratization,9 they are
problematic when the institutional conﬁguration of countries vary independently of
their regime classiﬁcation. For example, some autocracies may have higher levels of
ﬁscal transparency than democracies,10 and if the ﬁndings of Alt and Lassen (2006)
and others are correct, such autocracies should not produce PBCs. One-dimensional
conceptualizations and dichotomous measures of democratization also miss substan-
tial within-type variations. Finally, as democratization itself is not a linear process,
but can occur in a piecemeal fashion, accompanied by advancements in one insti-
tutional dimension  such as competition  and stagnancy in others (Capoccia and
Ziblatt, 2010), one-dimensional conceptualizations fail to grasp the gradual nature of
democratization which, in itself, deﬁnes the strategic space within which PBCs are
created. Therefore, we consider it a necessary ﬁrst step to unpack democratization
and identify how it aﬀects the institutions that shape the ability and incentives of
incumbents to create PBCs.
A Two-Dimensional Conceptualization of Democratization
We propose a two-dimensional conceptualization of democratization that focuses on
executive constraints and political competition. While we recognize there are other
dimensions of democratization, the most important of which is perhaps public partic-
9 See, for for example, the literature on growth in autocracies and democracies (Prze-
worski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003).
10A country like Singapore comes to mind.
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ipation (Dahl, 1971), we argue that executive constraints and political competition
are pivotal for the purposes of this study as they have direct bearings on incum-
bents' abilities and incentives to create PBCs.11 The aggregate eﬀect of democra-
tization thus depends on its disaggregate composition: if democratic advancements
are driven by the introduction of more substantial constraints on executive powers,
the eﬀect is negative; if they are driven by more intense political competition, the
eﬀect is positive. In the following, we describe the two dimensions and their eﬀects
on PBCs in greater detail.
Executive Constraints and Political Competition
The ﬁrst dimension is executive constraints. This dimension is similar to what Linz
and Stepan (1996) and Linz (2000) call leadership constraints, although narrower in
that it focuses speciﬁcally on constraints on executive decision-making powers.12 The
basic idea is that executive decision-making powers must be restricted for countries
to be democratic, and that countries with more restrictions are more democratic than
countries with fewer restrictions. While we recgonise that constraints can derive from
intra-party opposition in dominant-party systems, the military in coup-prone states,
or an independent judiciary as is the case in many hybrid regimes, in this article,
11For a discussion of abilities and incentives in the context of PBCs, see Alt and Rose
(2009).
12For Linz and Stepan (1996), leadership constraints include constraints on the se-
lection of leaders, such as constitutional requirements for elections and term limits.
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we focus on constraints in the form of an independent legislature and a functioning
opposition. This is consistent with our general emphasis on formal institutions.
The constraints on decision-making powers are important as they have direct
bearings on incumbents' ability to create PBCs. If their decision-making powers
are unconstrained, for example, because the chief executive rules by decree or, as
the leader of the ruling party, controls a majority of the members of parliament,
incumbents can easily create PBCs. By contrast, if their decision-making powers
are substantially constrained, for example, because the ruling party does not hold
a majority in parliament, creating PBCs becomes diﬃcult, as it requires negotia-
tions with, and probably concessions to, opposition parties or individual members
of parliament. The concept of executive constraints thus captures many of the con-
taining institutional eﬀects found in PBC research: presidentialism (Franzese, 2002)
and ﬁrst-past-the-post elections (Persson and Tabellini, 2003a), for example, contain
PBCs by reducing the government's powers over individual members of parliament,
as do the existence of veto players (Streb et al., 2009; Streb and Torrens, 2013) and
stringent ﬁscal rules (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Rose, 2006), which limit governments'
ﬁscal leeway.
The second dimension of democratization we propose is political competition.
The idea, here, is that countries, to be democratic, must allow political competition,
and that countries with more competition are more democratic than countries with
less competition. The concept is similar to what Dahl (1971) calls contestation and
thus relates to civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association,
without which contestation is restricted. However, we focus on one speciﬁc aspect
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of competition, namely whether or not multiple parties compete for power. If the
only oppositional activity permitted is within the ruling party of a one-party state,
politics is uncompetitive.13 By contrast, if multiple parties operate freely, contest
elections regularly, and accept defeat when they lose, politics is competitive.
As executive constraints determine incumbents' ability to create PBCs, political
competition shapes their incentive. If politics is uncompetitive, there is no real risk
of losing, and therefore no incentive to create PBCs. By contrast, if the possibility
of government defeat exists, there is an incentive for ﬁscal manipulation. We recog-
nize that other factors may aﬀect incumbents' incentives, such as ego-rents (Shi and
Svensson, 2006), endogenous timing of elections (Alesina et al., 1993), and constitu-
tional term limits (Kayser, 2005). However, we consider these factors secondary to
political competition.
Electoral Competitiveness
We have argued that the level of executive constraints and political competition de-
ﬁnes the strategic space within which incumbents manipulate spending before elec-
tions. However, no level of executive constraints and political competition can, by
itself, create PBCs. To trigger the ﬂuctuations, incumbents must fear losing. We
13Comparing inter- and intra-party competition, Sartori (1976, 44, italics in original)
concludes that all in all, nothing goes to show how and why intra-party rivalry can
be a substitute for, or assimilated to, inter-party competition. Intra-party dissent
alone expresses - and induces - a 'private' far more than a 'functional' contest.
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capture this fear in the concept of electoral competitiveness. Distinguishing between
competition and competitiveness, we draw on Sartori (1976, 218) who explains the
diﬀerence as follows: competition is a structure, or a rule of the game [while] compet-
itiveness is a particularly state of the game. Thus, there can be competition without
competitiveness, but no competitiveness without competition; or, as Sartori puts it,
competition is [...] potential competitiveness (1976, 218). To illustrate his point,
Sartori gives the example of a dominant-party system, which abides by the rules of
competition but testiﬁes to low competitiveness, or even to no near-competitiveness
(1976, 218). At the other extreme, he continues, competition is `competitive' when
two or more parties obtain close returns and win on thin margins (1976, 218).
The distinction is useful for the purposes of this study as it captures the diﬀerence
between political competition, as a dimension of democratization that conditions
PBCs, and electoral competitiveness, as the factor that triggers them. The two are
related in that political competition is a precondition for electoral competitiveness.
Political competition thus increases the incentive to create PBCs as it involves the
possibility of electoral competitiveness, but incumbents do not create PBCs unless
they fear losing.
The idea is not new.14 For example, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1993), in one
of the ﬁrst tests of the Rogoﬀ model, speculate that PBCs may only occur when
incumbents are unsure of reappointment and need an extra electoral boost (Alesina
et al., 1993, 21). Empirically, competitiveness has been tested in only developed
14To our knowledge, the ﬁrst to introduce the idea is Frey and Schneider (1978), who
ﬁnd that in the US current spending decreases with the incumbent's popularity.
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countries and only sub-national level (Schultz, 1995; Price, 1998; Alt and Rose, 2009;
Aidt and Eterovic, 2011; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001; Schneider, 2010). We ﬁnd the
same dynamic in developing countries.15
Bringing Regime Types Back In
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we brieﬂy consider the implications of our
argument on the occurrence of PBCs across regime types. We have argued that one-
dimensional conceptualizations and dichotomous measures miss the countervailing
eﬀects of diﬀerent dimensions of democratization. In principle, this means that
PBCs can occur in any country insofar as there are suﬃciently few constraints on
the executive, politics is suﬃciently competitive, and the incumbent fears losing the
elections. In practice, as we shall demonstrate below, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid
regimes because executive constraints and political competition covary along the
regime spectrum. In countries with few constraints on the executive, politics also tend
to be uncompetitive. If parliament cannot initiate or veto legislation, the political
space is signiﬁcantly reduced. By contrast, in countries where there are substantial
constraints on the executive, politics tends to be competitive. If parliament regularly
15Recently, Hanusch and Magleby (2014) have suggested that, under conditions of
high party polarization, even incumbents who are likely to lose may have an in-
centive to create PBCs, namely to allocate resources to their preferred areas, while
leaving the ﬁnancing to their successors. While we do not disagree with the argu-
ment, it goes beyond the scope of this article to test it.
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rejects government requests for funding, or rejects budgets altogether, it is often
a consequence of a strong and well-organized opposition able to break the voting
discipline of the governing party or coalition.
Figure 1 summarizes our argument and plots distribution of our data across the
spectrum of executive constraints and political competition. Darker areas indicate
more observations. The ﬁgure shows how PBCs vary theoretically along the diagonal
axis from the upper left corner to the lower right: least likely in countries with
low levels of political competition and many constraints on the executive, and most
likely in countries with high levels of political competition and few constraints on
the executive. Regimes, by contrast, tend to vary empirically along the diagonal axis
from the lower left corner to the upper right: from full autocracies with low levels of
political competition and few constraints on the executive, to full democracies with
high levels of political competition and substantial constraints on the executive. The
net result is that PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes, when incumbents fear
losing elections.
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Figure 1: PBCs across Regime Types
Note: The shaded areas represent the empirical distribution of regimes along the two di-
mensions; darker areas signify more observations. We use Parcomp to measure competition
and Xconst to measure constraints. Both are taken from the Polity dataset (Marshall
et al., 2011). The competition threshold is set at Parcomp=2 ; the constraint threshold at
Xconst=5 . The thresholds will be explained in greater detail later.
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Empirical Analysis
This section subjects our theoretical argument to empirical scrutiny, using time-
series cross-sectional analysis of spending data in 112 countries, from across the
regime range, covering the period from 1960 to 2006.16 The ﬁndings of our analysis
support the argument that the occurrence and the size of PBCs depend on the
speciﬁc combination of executive constraints, political competition, and electoral
competitiveness. The section presents three key ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd evidence
of important threshold eﬀects with regard to constraints and competition, implying
that above a maximal level of constraints and below a minimal level of competition
PBCs do not occur. Second, we show that incumbents manipulate the budget as a
function of electoral competitiveness. Third, given the empirical covariation between
constraints and competition along the spectrum of political regimes, we provide
evidence that PBCs are prevalent in hybrid regimes.
Dependent Variable
To measure pre-electoral manipulation of the budget, we use Budget balance as our
primary dependent variable.17 Measured as a share of the country's GDP, the variable
is negative if the government runs a budget deﬁcit and positive in the case of a sur-
plus. In addition, we provide an alternative measure of PBCs, Government spending,
to ascertain the robustness of our ﬁndings. The variable is measured on a per capita
16All included countries are listed in the Online Appendix.
17Summary statistics for all variables can be found in the Online Appendix.
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basis, using constant 2005 $US (PPP).18 By using a per capita measure as opposed to
GDP-weighted measures, we ensure that spending increases are not uniquely driven
by variations in the denominator. Recent research has demonstrated that elections
aﬀect not only aggregate spending levels but also the disaggregate composition of
spending (Vergne, 2009). While we acknowledge the importance of this body of
research, it goes beyond the scope of this article to examine how democratization
might aﬀect budget allocations.
The underlying data for both measures are taken from two sources: (i) for OECD
members, all data are provided by the organization's statistical oﬃce (OECD, 2015);
for non-OECD countries, we use a new dataset on Global State Revenues and Expen-
ditures (GSRE) (Lucas and Richter, 2012).19 This dataset is based on spending and
revenue data from historical documents of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
stored in the IMF's archives in Washington, D.C. It uses the annual reports of the
IMF's regional departments, which were made available to researchers in the early
2000s. These reports are usually available from the year of a country's membership
in the IMF, with the most recent documents being declassiﬁed after a period of ﬁve
years.
It is important to note that the statistical data contained in the annual reports
18The variable is constructed by dividing the total government expenditures in local
currency unit (LCU) by the nominal GDP in LCU. This ratio is then multiplied
by GDP per capita values taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006).
19The only exception is India which is, as yet, not included in the GSRE. We therefore
use data from the IMF Government Finance Statistics.
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are collected independently of the IMF's statistical department, which produces the
widely used IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS). This has both advantages
and disadvantages. A disadvantage is that the diﬀerent regional departments are
likely to apply slightly diﬀerent accounting standards, which might lead to distortions
of the same measure across countries. While this is a valid concern for more ﬁne-
grained measures, such as speciﬁc types of taxes or functional expenditures, it is less
of an issue for more aggregate indicators, such as the ones used herein. An advantage
of using the annual reports is that the data are likely to be more valid than those
provided by the GFS. The GFS is based on an annual survey sent out to member
states, whereas data in the annual reports are collected by the country and sub-
regional representative oﬃces of the IMF and negotiated with national authorities.
It is not rare that this process leads to a revision of the ﬁgures when confronted with
disagreement from the IMF experts.20
Besides improved validity, the GSRE substantially increases the number of ob-
servations. While the GFS only starts in 1972, the GSRE dataset goes further back
in time, for some countries until the end of World War II. Considering our depen-
dent variable, Budget balance, the GSRE contains 3932 country-year observations
compared to only 2118 in the GFS. Furthermore, the GFS does currently not have
one continuous time series from 1972 until present. Rather, due to changes in the
IMF's classiﬁcation scheme, there are currently two time series running respectively
from 1972 to 2001 and from 1990 until present. The GSRE, by contrast, provides
20This description is based on correspondence with the IMF statistical department
as well as members of regional departments.
19
one continuous time series of comparable data. Taken together, the GSRE is not
a mere extension of the GFS but represents an alternative data source to analyze
public revenues and expenditures.21
Explanatory Variables I and II: Constraints and Competition
Concerning the measurement of constraints, we use the Polity indicator Xconst to
capture the level of constraints weighing on the chief executive. According to the
authors of the Polity IV dataset, the variable refers to the extent of institutionalized
constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives (Marshall et al., 2011,
24). It thus adequately captures the degree to which incumbents are constrained in
their ability to put into action the political decisions leading to PBCs. Each country
is coded on a 7-point scale, ranging from (1) unlimited authority to (7) executive
parity and subordination. The variable assumes an underlying continuum of diﬀerent
levels of political constraints imposed on the executive.
With regard to competition, we seek a measure that allows us to distinguish
elections that, in principle, can be lost from those that are merely bogus. Hyde
and Marinov (2012) propose a minimalist measure of competition which only takes
into account characteristics of elections. Speciﬁcally, they consider elections compet-
itive if opposition is allowed, more than one party is legal, and there is a choice of
candidates on the ballot. Whilst we acknowledge that these are essential attributes
21The correlation between both datasets is still very high, reaching 0.72 percent in
the case of budget balance and total expenditures.
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of competitive elections, we doubt that these criteria alone guarantee meaningful
political competition. Research on electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002; Lev-
itsky and Way, 2002; Diamond, 2002) has shown that incumbents have a panoply of
measures at their disposal to eﬀace electoral competition. More importantly, most
of these instruments are not limited to elections themselves but happen outside the
context of impending elections. Opposition parties can be banned shortly before elec-
tions or be subject to such political harassment that their chances of electoral success
are crippled. Thus, even if elections are deemed competitive in a minimalist sense,
in the absence of additional institutional safeguards that ensure the organization of
political competition, incumbents can still be certain of winning.
We therefore combine two diﬀerent indicators of political competition. First, our
variable Election is based on Hyde and Marinov's (2012) deﬁnition of competitive
elections. Countries that have never had a competitive election as deﬁned above are
excluded from the analysis.22 Since we expect PBCs to be particularly pronounced
when elections determine the leadership of a country, we restrict our analysis to
politically important elections; that is, elections where the chief executive's oﬃce is
at stake.23 The election dummy variable equals 1 in an election year and 0 otherwise.
However, we adjust the variable to be consistent with the ﬁscal year when spending
22There are 41 such countries in our dataset
23In practice, this means that we do not consider parliamentary elections in presiden-
tial political systems. To select politically important elections, we combine data
from the Arthur Banks Dataset (2011) on the type and the mode of selection of
the chief executive.
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data are reported for a ﬁscal year diﬀerent than the calendar year. This adjustment
is consistent with common practice in the literature (e.g., Block et al., 2003; Brender
and Drazen, 2005).
Second, we use the Polity indicator Parcomp to account for restrictions on politi-
cal competition more broadly. The variable measures the extent to which alternative
preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena (Marshall
et al., 2011, 26). Ranging from 1 (repressed) to 5 (competitive), the scale concep-
tualizes political competition as a continuum. For example, a Parcomp score of 1
(repressed) signiﬁes that no signiﬁcant oppositional activity is permitted outside
the ranks of the regime and ruling party (Marshall et al., 2011, 26). A score of 2
(suppressed) indicates severe limitations of political participation and an exclusion of
at least 20 percent of the adult population from participation. By contrast, polities
reaching a Parcomp score of 5 (competitive) guarantee unconstrained and regular
competition between political actors.24
Explanatory Variable III: Competitiveness
To proxy competitiveness, we resort to the most commonly used indicator in the
literature: win-margins. The variable has been widely used, particularly in the
24It has rightly been pointed out that the Parcomp variable can have non-linear eﬀects
as it codes factional competition at the intermediate level, which is conceptually
diﬀerent from other levels of the variable (Vreeland, 2008). We address this point
in our robustness checks in the Online Appendix.
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North American context, to study electoral turnout (Southwell and Burchett, 2000;
Endersby et al., 2008; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998) and the characteristics of the
party system (Abramowitz et al., 2008; Koetzle, 1998; Trounstine, 2006; Holbrook
and Tidmarch, 1993). Capturing the closeness of elections, win-margins can be
considered a reliable indicator of competitiveness of elections.
The variable Winmargin measures the incumbent's win-margin, in percent, in
the last elections. It ranges from 0 to 100, with lower values indicating higher lev-
els of competitiveness. In the case of presidential elections, the margin consists of
the diﬀerence between the winner's vote share minus the vote share of the runner-
up.25 As global data on vote shares in parliamentary elections are hard to come by,
win-margins in parliamentary elections are calculated as the diﬀerence between the
winning party's (or party coalition's) share of seats minus the opposition's share. We
acknowledge that, depending on the type of electoral system, vote and seat shares
can diverge considerably in parliamentary systems, which might distort our measure-
ment. While there is no easy ﬁx for this problem, seat shares eventually determine
the balance of power in parliament and might thus be considered the preferable
indicator of competitiveness. This being said, we also address this issue in our esti-
mation strategy by running regressions with and without legislative elections.26 Data
on electoral results are taken from three main sources: the Election Results Archive
25If no candidate was elected in the ﬁrst round, we took the results of the second round
to calculate the win-margin; but we also use ﬁrst-round results as a robustness test
in the Online Appendix.
26Results are available in the Online Appendix.
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(2012), Psephos (Carr, 2013), and the World Bank (2013).
To take into account the heterogeneity of our sample, we make two adjustments
to the Winmargin variable. First, we code Winmargin zero in the case of (a) ﬁrst
politically important and competitive elections after independence, and (b) founding
elections after an autocratic interlude. In ﬁrst and founding elections, we expect
electoral conﬁdence to be very low and thus insecurity to be at its maximum. This
heightened insecurity stems from the unpredictable consequences of boosts in voter
turnout, as voters are stimulated to participate by an open contest (Bratton and
Van de Walle, 1997, 210) following an opening of the political system, and the ab-
sence of any real knowledge of voter preferences. We acknowledge that this is a strong
assumption and therefore run robustness tests without these founding elections avail-
able in the Online Appendix. Second, following convention in PBC research (e.g.,
Efthyvoulou, 2011), we code Winmargin zero in any year without electoral competi-
tion as the level of competitiveness is not expected to aﬀect spending outside election
years.27
27In the Online Appendix, we test this claim by carrying levels of competitiveness for-
ward until the next election and interacting this variable with our election dummy.
The substantive ﬁnding remains robust. The Online Appendix also includes a
graphical display of the distribution of Winmargin and the change of Winmargin
between elections.
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Control Variables
The regression includes a number of standard socioeconomic and political variables
to control for the eﬀect of potential confounders. Since wealthier countries might ﬁnd
it easier to run higher deﬁcits prior to elections, we control for GDP p.c. (logged). In
addition, variations in the economic cycle tend to aﬀect the ﬁscal balance as years of
strong economic growth entail higher revenues from taxes and vice-versa. We thus
include Growth as a control variable. Data for both variables are taken from the
Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006).
Varying levels of government revenues are also likely to inﬂuence PBCs: positively
by providing incumbents with the ﬁnancial resources to create PBC; negatively by
signaling ﬁscal prudence and thus strengthening incumbents' re-election prospects.
We therefore include three variables that measure the level of available resources:
Tax revenues/GDP, taken from the GSRE (Lucas and Richter, 2012) and the OECD
(2015) respectively, accounts for the amount of direct and indirect taxes accrued to
the government, weighted by the country's GDP. Rents p.c. (logged) is taken from
Haber and Menaldo (2011) and measures the government's income from extractable
resources, mostly oil, in logged constant 2007 $US per capita. Aid p.c. (logged),
measured in constant 2008 $US per capita, captures the eﬀect of foreign aid on
the government's distributive capacity and is based on data from the World Bank
(2010).28
28Note that no OECD country has been a recipient of foreign development aid in the
time period under observation.
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The variable IMF indicates whether a country participated in an IMF program
in a given country year. Since ﬁscal austerity has been a widespread corollary of
IMF conditionality, IMF agreements are expected to limit a government's ability to
contract new debt and hike up the deﬁcit (Hyde and O'Mahony, 2010). We use
an updated version of Dreher (2006) to obtain the data. Likewise, the level of a
country's Debt service could negatively aﬀect the government's borrowing capacity
and can thus impede the incumbent's ability to manipulate the budget. The variable
is measured as a share of the gross national income and taken fromWorld Bank (2010)
and OECD (2015) respectively. Finally, it might be the case that more experienced
incumbents are more skillful in manipulating spending opportunistically (Aidt and
Eterovic, 2011). We control for this possible Tenure eﬀect by including a count
variable of the number of years an incumbent has been in oﬃce, using the Archigos
dataset (Goemans et al., 2009).29
29Studies of PBCs in early 19th century UK demonstrate that the introduction of
universal suﬀrage in 1921 aﬀected spending allocation (Aidt and Mooney, 2014).
Based on this ﬁnding, it could be argued that we should control for universal
suﬀrage. However, as all countries in our dataset had universal suﬀrage throughout
the sample period, with the exception of South Africa, we refrain from including a
dummy in the regressions.
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Estimation Strategy and Model
In view of our theoretical argument, we propose a subsample strategy to test the
eﬀect of executive constraints, political competition, and electoral competitiveness.
The estimation strategy proceeds in three steps. First, we explore whether PBCs
occur below a minimum level of competition. We choose a Parcomp level of 2 as a
threshold for meaningful competition, excluding both repressed and suppressed com-
petition. In doing so, we make sure that political opposition is not systematically
repressed, candidates are not ruled oﬀ ballots, access to media is guaranteed, and at
least 80 percent of the adult population are allowed political participation (Marshall
et al., 2011, 26-27). Second, we test whether PBCs occur above a maximal level
of constraints on the executive. We propose a threshold between Xconst levels 5
and 6, meaning that we distinguish between cases of complete or nearly complete
subordination of the executive and more limited levels of executive constraints. At
Xconst levels of 5 and below, most requests for funds are approved by the legisla-
ture (Marshall et al., 2011, 25), which gives the incumbent suﬃcient institutional
leeway to hike up spending prior to elections. Third, we estimate the subsample
in-between both thresholds (Parcomp > 2, Xconst < 6). Our theory predicts that
PBCs should not occur in the ﬁrst two subsamples, but occur in the latter conditional
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upon competitiveness.30
To estimate our regression, we use the following standard model as suggested in
the literature (e.g., Shi and Svensson, 2006):
Yit = β0+β1Yit−1+β2Election+β3Election×Winmargin+β4Xit+Ni+Tt+εit,
where Yit represents the budget balance, β0 is a constant, Yit−1 is the one-period lag
of the dependent variable, Xit is a vector of control variables, Ni and Tt are country
and period ﬁxed eﬀects, and εit represents the error term. A number of points
should be noted. First, as the budget balance is characterized by high levels of
inertia, we include the lag of the dependent variable to purge the regression of serial
correlation.31 Second, there are a number of possible country-speciﬁc confounders
for which it is hard to control. For instance, the median voter's preference for
redistribution varies across countries, which might aﬀect the incumbent's propensity
to engage in deﬁcit spending. We therefore include country ﬁxed eﬀects to prevent
this kind of omitted variable bias. Similarly, we add time ﬁxed eﬀects to control for
periodical shocks in the panel.32 Third, we use robust standard errors that adjust
30We empirically demonstrate further below and in the Online Appendix that the
choice of these thresholds is justiﬁable. We also present results from a triple inter-
action between Election, Winmargin, and Xconst and Parcomp respectively, which
are in line with the general argument of this paper.
31A Breusch-Godfrey test indicates that there is no remaining serial correlation of a
higher order.
32A Hausman test also suggests the use of country and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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for within-country correlation to deal with the presence of heteroskedasticity in our
panel.33
The regression is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). We are aware
that autoregressive models combined with country ﬁxed eﬀects make the parameter
estimates potentially liable to bias (Nickell, 1981). However, given an average length
of 23 years per time series, the bias becomes very small. Moreover, Beck and Katz
(2011) have shown that alternative estimators actually perform worse in the presence
of long time series. Finally, given that Winmargin is coded zero in years without
elections, the variable drops out as a base term in the regression.34
Main Findings
Table 1 presents our results using Budget balance as the dependent variable. Table
2 replicates the same set of regressions for Government spending. Models 1, 3, and
5 test the eﬀect of elections without conditioning for competitiveness. In Models
2, 4, and 6, an interaction term between Winmargin and Election is added. Sub-
stantively, both tables provide support for our hypotheses about the link between
executive constraints, political competition, and electoral competitiveness. Consid-
ering Models 1 and 2, it appears that PBCs do not occur below a minimal level of
political competition. Wherever opposition faces outright repression or is suppressed
33Panel-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity was detected using a modiﬁed Wald test.
34A continuous version of Winmargin is tested in the Online Appendix. The sub-
stantive ﬁndings remain unchanged.
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by liberticide restrictions, incumbents seem to have little incentive to waste scarce
resources on elections with a certain outcome. As competition is a precondition for
competitiveness, the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient is as expected. We do not rule out the
possibility that autocracies exhibit PBCs in disaggregate or subnational spending
(Blaydes and Kayser, 2011; Gao, 2009) but our analysis strongly suggests that they
do not exhibit PBCs in aggregate spending. Models 3 and 4 show a similar picture
with regard to the eﬀect of constraints. Although the coeﬃcients of Election have
the right sign, they are both far from conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance.
The results thus suggest that if the constraints on incumbents are too high, they
are unable to manipulate the budget despite the presence of a strong incentive to
do so. Given the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient of Winmargin, this even applies to cases
where past elections have been very close, which in our view signal an increased risk
of losing.
Turning to Models 5 and 6, the results suggest that PBCs indeed occur in political
environments with limited constraints and meaningful competition, conditional on
competitiveness. The results are weaker for Government spending with the Election
and Election*Winmargin approaching but failing to achieve conventional levels of
statistical signiﬁcance (p=0.123 and p=148 respectively). That said, the overall pat-
tern of a countervailing eﬀect of competitiveness conditioning the eﬀect of elections
seems to be very similar. In Model 5, the election dummy is not signiﬁcant, which
means that there is no general pattern of PBCs regardless of competitiveness. Only
if one takes into consideration the closeness of past elections, election years seem to
be associated with signiﬁcant spikes in spending and higher deﬁcits. Consistent with
30
our argument, Election and Winmargin have countervailing eﬀects as shown by the
opposite sign of the coeﬃcients. When competitiveness is at its maximum, incum-
bents reduce their budget balance by 1.2 percentage points on average. Expressed
in spending per capita, this amounts to 19 $US of additional government outlays.
As past win-margins increase, however, the budget balance improves and the PBCs
become weaker. At win-margins of 10 percent, for example, PBCs are reduced by
about 25 percent, measured in terms of budget deﬁcit, and 23 percent in terms of
spending.
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Table 1: PBCs in Budget Balance across Diﬀerent Levels of Competition and Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parcomp<3 Parcomp<3 Xconst>5 Xconst>5 Parcomp>2 Parcomp>2
Xconst<6 Xconst<6
Budget balance t−1 0.566∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.066) (0.066) (0.070) (0.068)
Election −0.006 −0.005 −0.001 0.0003 −0.004 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Election*Winmargin −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.020∗ 0.020∗ 0.006 0.006 0.027 0.026
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
Growth 0.036 0.036 0.118∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.047 0.047 0.178∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.012 0.019
(0.067) (0.067) (0.040) (0.039) (0.121) (0.119)
Rents p.c. (logged) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.00004 −0.009 −0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Debt service −0.0003 −0.0003 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
IMF 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 −0.003 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Tenure 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,101 1,101 511 511
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: PBCs in Spending across Diﬀerent Levels of Competition and Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parcomp<3 Parcomp<3 Xconst>5 Xconst>5 Parcomp>2 Parcomp>2
Xconst<6 Xconst<6
Government spending t−1 0.614∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.058) (0.058) (0.053) (0.053)
Election 10.719 17.228 14.046 11.992 6.434 18.863
(13.491) (19.478) (11.771) (13.233) (10.226) (12.210)
Election*Winmargin −0.235 0.251 −0.438
(0.369) (0.530) (0.302)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.348∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.057) (0.057) (0.068) (0.069)
Growth 0.511∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.090) (0.090) (0.116) (0.116)
Tax revenues/GDP 1.671∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 2.334∗∗∗ 2.317∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.243) (0.202) (0.203) (0.371) (0.354)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.0004 −0.0004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Aid p.c. (logged) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004 0.040∗ 0.040∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.024)
Debt service −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004∗ −0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF 0.003 0.003 −0.004 −0.004 0.009 0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
Tenure −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1,017 1,017 1,100 1,100 512 512
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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As mentioned, it has been suggested that PBCs are reversed when elections are
uncompetitive (Block et al., 2003). In our model, this would imply that PBCs
should disappear below a certain level of competitiveness. The best way to explore
this eventuality is by graphical illustration. Figure 2 displays the budget balance
for varying win-margins, estimated for countries in the hybrid middle between the
thresholds.35 The solid line represents the average eﬀect; the two dotted lines the
95 percent conﬁdence bounds.36 The graph also includes a histogram to illustrate
the distribution of win-margins in our subsample.37 Clearly, most elections are only
won by a narrow margin. In other words, most incumbents are relatively insecure
about their re-election and it is indeed these incumbents who manipulate spending
before elections. In view of Figure 2, elections are associated with signiﬁcantly
greater budget deﬁcits up to win-margins of 12 percent, while the size of the budget
deﬁcit shrinks as competitiveness increases. Moreover, above past win-margins of 12
percent, the upper conﬁdence bound crosses the zero line, suggesting that incumbents
might actually reduce their budget deﬁcits in election years. For past win-margins
above 45 percent, also the average eﬀect becomes positive, whilst the lower conﬁdence
bound remains below the zero line. We draw two main conclusions from this. First,
in view of the lower conﬁdence bound, increasing win-margins, at least, reduce the
size of the budget cycle. This eﬀect should be observable nearly across the whole
35The graphs follow the suggestions of Berry et al. (2012).
36The scale for the eﬀect on the ﬁscal balance can be found on the left y-axis.
37The scale for the histogram can be found on the right y-axis.
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subsample. Second, if past win-margins exceed a certain threshold, we cannot be
certain that PBCs actually occur.
Figure 2: Marginal Eﬀect of Competitiveness on PBCs
35
Robustness Tests
Varying Thresholds for Competition and Constraints
It is a common practice to test the robustness of empirical ﬁndings by varying the
threshold of variables to see if the results still hold. This strategy hinges on the
assumption that most thresholds in the social sciences are somewhat arbitrary. While
we generally agree with the latter point, we propose a more reﬁned strategy to test
the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent thresholds of Parcomp and Xconst. In fact, as
changing the thresholds re-arranges distinct polities into newly formed subsamples,
we do not expect our results to remain exactly the same. Rather, we suggest that as
we move the thresholds for the three subsamples in diﬀerent directions, the pattern
of change in the results will be informative for the theoretical argument we have
made.
More speciﬁcally, we expect signiﬁcance levels of Election and Election*Winmargin
(a) to increase for the subsample of countries below the competition threshold, as
we raise the threshold for competition (more countries with competitive political
systems and the incentive to create PBCs are added to the subsample); (b) to in-
crease for the subsample of countries above the constraints threshold, as we lower
the threshold for constraints (more countries with fewer executive constraints and
the ability to create PBCs are included); and (c) to decrease for the subsample in-
between both thresholds when lowering the threshold for competition or raising the
threshold of constraints (more countries with less competitive political systems and
more executive constraints, and thus less incentive and ability to create PBCs, are
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added to the subsample). Moreover, in the case of (a) and (b), we expect the sign
of Election*Winmargin to turn, as we start to see the expected counter-eﬀect as
win-margins increase.
Figure 3 summarizes our propositions graphically. As this strategy involves run-
ning a considerable number of regressions on diﬀerent subsamples, we refer the reader
to the Online Appendix for a detailed presentation of the results. To adumbrate the
results, we indeed begin to see signs of PBCs in the subsample of non-competitive
polities as we move the competition threshold upward, and in the subsample of heav-
ily constrained polities as we move the constraint threshold downward. Conversely,
PBCs become weaker for the subsample in-between both thresholds, when we raise
the threshold for constraints or lower it for competition.
Figure 3: Expected Eﬀect of Varying Thresholds of Competition and Constraints
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Additional Robustness Tests
To ascertain the validity of our ﬁndings, we conduct a number of additional robust-
ness tests, the results of which are detailed in the Online Appendix. In addition to
raising and lowering the competition and executitve constraints thresholds as out-
lined above, we run triple interaction models between Election, Winmargin, and
Parcomp and Xconst respectively. The results conﬁrm our ﬁndings from the sub-
sample strategy in that PBCs are absent below a minimum level of competition and
become more pronounced as competition increases; likewise, PBCs become less pro-
nounced as constraints on the executive increase and disappear above a maximum
level of constraints. These triple interaction models also suggest that there are no
non-linear eﬀects for Parcomp in our sample. Nonetheless, we run an additionial ro-
bustness test in which we replicate our sub-sample strategy replacing Parcomp with
an alternative indicator Party bans, taken from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al.,
2015). The substantive ﬁndings regarding competition remain unchanged.
Additional robustness tests also include rerunning our regressions with diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations. Using year or country ﬁxed eﬀects only, as well as running a
pure random eﬀects model does not substantively alter the results. In addition, we
test the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to additional control variables, such as urbaniza-
tion, trade, and the share of the dependent population. Data are taken from the
World Bank (2010). If election dates are not ﬁxed by law, incumbents have an in-
centive to call early elections if the economic cycle is propitious. We therefore add
a variable for endogenous timing of elections, taken from Hyde (2011), to control
for this opportunity eﬀect. As the incumbent's ability to engage in PBCs might be
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hampered if she heads a minority government, we also add a dummy indicator for
minority governments to the regression.
Another robustness check consists of taking out legislative elections as the mea-
surement of win-margins based on the proportion of seats rather than votes can be
problematic, particularly in the case of majoritarian systems. Similarly, we rerun our
main model using the win-margin of ﬁrst-round presidential elections in case there
were two rounds. We further consider a continuous measure of win-margin where
we carry the past win-margin forward until the year of the election. While the non-
interacted coeﬃcient of Winmargin does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect, the interacted
part remains signiﬁcant. We also rerun our model without founding elections to
make sure that the results are not driven by our speciﬁc coding choice of Winmargin
in these elections. And, ﬁnally, we rerun our model excluding elections in which the
change of win-margin is greater than one standard deviation (25 percent) as this
might signify changes in the quality of democracy. To all of the above modiﬁcations,
our substantive ﬁndings remain robust.
PBCs and Regime Type
Given the empirical covariation between executive constraints and political compe-
tition along the spectrum of political regimes, our theoretical argument implies that
PBCs should be found predominantly in the hybrid middle. Only in the gray zone,
regularized, competitive elections are combined with limited constraints on the power
of the executive (Cassani, 2014). The challenge, however, is to ﬁnd a good measure
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of hybrid regimes. As Armony and Schamis (2005) have pointed out, using mea-
sures that rely on ex post classiﬁcation based on electoral results  most commonly
a 75 percent threshold won by the ruling party (Brownlee, 2009; Diamond, 2002) 
to distinguish hegemonic authoritarian regimes from hybrids, whilst using ex ante
criteria for democracies is inconsistent. Dichotomous measures of political regimes
are unable to capture the atypical combination of competitive elections and few con-
straints prevalent in hybrid regimes. Howard and Roessler (2006) and Blaydes and
Kayser (2011) use the Polity indicator to identify hybrid regimes, yet in our case this
measure would be too closely correlated with our indicators of constraints and com-
petition, given that Xconst and Parcomp are subcomponents of the Polity score. We
therefore use the typology of Wahman et al. (2013) to distinguish between diﬀerent
regimes types.38
Concretely, we take their multiparty authoritarian category as a proxy for hybrid
regimes.39 As Wahman et al. (2013, 27) point out, in these regimes, at least a mini-
mal level of competition is allowed and some opposition candidates [...] are allowed to
participate in national elections. We further use their democracy dummy to identify
fully democratic regimes and code all remaining, non-multiparty regimes as autoc-
38Based on a combination of Freedom House and Polity, the measure might still be
correlated with our indicators for constraints and competition. However, facing
diﬀerent suboptimal choices, their typology has the fewest drawbacks of all for the
question at hand.
39This also resonates with Linde's (2009) suggestion to view hybrid regimes as sub-
types of authoritarianism.
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racies. We then estimate our base model in these three subsamples conditioning for
competitiveness measured in win-margins. The results, displayed in Table 3, broadly
support our argument. Neither in autocracies nor in democracies are there any signs
of PBCs. The election dummy and its interaction with Winmargin are insigniﬁcant
throughout. In column 1 and 2, the signs of both coeﬃcients are even reversed, sug-
gesting that elections reduce the deﬁcit rather than increase it. By contrast, there
are strong indications for PBCs in hybrid regimes. The election dummy is highly sig-
niﬁcant and the sign of the interaction term indicates the expected counter-eﬀect of
electoral competitiveness. However, the conditioning eﬀect of competitiveness seems
to be weaker in hybrid regimes. The interaction terms in columns 3 and 6 show
either no (p=0.35) or only weak signiﬁcance. Most probably, this divergence from
previous ﬁndings has to do with the fact that the category of multiparty authoritar-
ian regimes includes a number of relatively uncompetitive cases. With this caveat
attached, the overall argument empirically holds: PBCs predominantly occur in the
hybrid middle.
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Table 3: PBCs across Diﬀerent Regime Types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autocracies Democracies Hybrids Autocracies Democracies Hybrids
Budget balance t−1 0.594∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.062) (0.044)
Government spending t−1 0.753∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.010) (0.071)
Election 0.004 0.0002 −0.011∗∗ −2.035 14.802 44.518∗∗
(0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (15.520) (14.402) (18.661)
Election*Winmargin −0.0003∗ −0.00004 0.0001 −0.796 0.252 −0.554∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (1.272) (0.429) (0.312)
GDP p.c. (logged) −0.004 0.005 0.031∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.060) (0.059) (0.071)
Growth 0.058∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.025 0.410∗∗∗ 0.238∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.038) (0.025) (0.129) (0.132) (0.107)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.043 0.205∗∗∗ −0.076 1.699∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.046) (0.069) (0.283) (0.179) (0.369)
Rents p.c. (logged) 0.001 0.0002 −0.002 0.001 0.007∗ 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.012∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.004 0.067∗∗∗ 0.006 0.016
(0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.019) (0.004) (0.014)
Debt service −0.0005 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMF 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.008 −0.012 −0.016
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018)
Tenure −0.0001 −0.0004 0.00001 0.001 −0.0001 −0.002
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 868 1,062 619 872 1,063 619
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Conclusion
In this article, we have explored the eﬀect of democratization on PBCs. Under-
stood as a multi-dimensional process, democratization involves increasing executive
constraints and the intensiﬁcation of political competition, which aﬀect PBCs dif-
ferently. Moreover, we have shown that while unconstrained executive powers and
intense political competition are necessary conditions, it is electoral competitiveness
that triggers PBCs. If incumbents do not fear losing, they do not create PBCs. Fi-
nally, we have demonstrated that because of the empirical covariation between exec-
utive constraints and political competition, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes.
In full autocracies, there is no incentive to create PBCs; in advanced democracies,
incumbents do not have the ability.
The article has contributed to the literature on PBCs in three ways. First, it
has demonstrated that the observed eﬀect of democratization processes on PBCs is
non-linear: positive at the autocratic end of the regime spectrum, where PBCs are
stimulated by rising levels of political competition and electoral uncertainty; negative
at the democratic end, where they are contained by the growing numbers of executive
constraints. This multi-dimensional approach to democratization critically enhances
our understanding of the political economy dimension of democratic transitions. By
the same token, the article has added to the growing body of political economy
research that explores the eﬀects of democratization on ﬁscal outcomes (Aidt and
Eterovic, 2011; Eterovic and Eterovic, 2012). Second, the article has pointed to a
triggering eﬀect of electoral competitiveness. This ﬁnding contributes to the debate
on context-conditional PBCs (Alt and Rose, 2009) by highlighting the importance
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of incentives in addition to abilities. Third, as the most comprehensive study of
PBCs to date  using novel data and spanning the full spectrum of political regimes
 the article has contributed to extending the debate on PBCs to a broader range of
regimes, yielding insights for OECD and non-OECD countries alike.
As always, a number of questions remain unanswered. For example, it would
be interesting to explore the eﬀect of advancements in other democratic dimensions,
most notably public participation (Dahl, 1971). How does voter turnout aﬀect PBCs,
and how are the cycles aﬀected by diﬀerent levels of civic engagement? If combined
with our study, such work could provide a complete picture of the aggregate eﬀect
of democratization on PBCs. Moreover, a better understanding of how incumbents
gauge their electoral prospects would give researchers a better handle on variations
in PBCs. We have emphasized the importance of retrospective indicators of electoral
prospects, but how incumbents view the odds of electoral defeat or victory may be
highly dependent upon context, similar to PBCs themselves.
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Online Appendix
Summary Statistics
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Variation N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Budget balance overall 4,658 −0.04 0.07 −0.64 0.28
between 138 0.05 −0.33 0.07
within 35.02 0.05 −0.55 0.28
Government spending overall 4,445 2,791.60 4,442.69 13.02 23,016.32
between 134 4,087.35 80.50 14,224.3
within 33.17 1,600.40 −7,198.84 12,233.74
Election overall 6,532 0.14 0.34 0 1
between 142 0.084 0 0.33
within 46 0.33 −0.20 1.12
Winmargin overall 6,543 3.68 16.37 0.00 100.00
between 142 3.93 0 17.40
within 46.08 15.87 −13.72 101.41
GDP p.c. (logged) overall 5,823 8.18 1.29 4.76 10.84
between 136 1.22 5.75 10.30
within 42.82 0.36 6.48 10.73
Growth overall 5,710 0.02 0.07 −0.65 1.22
between 136 0.02 −0.02 0.11
within 41.99 0.07 −0.07 1.13
Tax revenues/GDP overall 3,846 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.57
between 124 0.10 0.03 0.46
within 31.016 0.04 0.02 0.56
Rents p.c. (logged) overall 5,694 2.42 3.99 −4.61 9.92
between 140 3.67 −4.61 7.61
within 40.67 1.57 −7.16 12.03
Aid p.c. (logged) overall 6,399 2.45 2.01 −6.03 6.92
between 138 1.65 0 5.72
within 46.37 1.02 −7.25 5.97
Debt service overall 4,474 3.68 5.12 0.00 138.89
between 126 3.22 0.07 15.43
within 35.51 4.03 −11.70 131.92
IMF overall 7,153 0.18 0.38 0 1
between 142 0.16 0 0.61
within 50.37 0.35 −0.43 1.16
Tenure overall 5,433 7.17 7.38 1 46
between 141 4.19 1.43 23.78
within 38.53 5.99 −15.61 32.99
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Urbanization overall 7,008 45.66 23.11 2.00 100.00
between 138 21.81 5.53 100
within 50.78 7.74 5.59 76.70
Dependency ratio overall 7,008 41.49 6.51 26.41 53.00
between 138 5.66 32.22 50.402
within 50.78 3.27 25.88 54.41
Endogenous elections overall 7,178 0.06 0.23 0 1
between 142 0.05 0 0.29
within 50.55 0.22 −0.24 1.04
Minority government overall 4,873 0.02 0.14 0 1
between 142 0.13 0 0.76
within 34.32 0.11 −0.74 1.00
Trade overall 5,825 67.19 44.14 1.96 453.44
between 136 39.45 13.63 338.86
within 42.83 20.47 −37.57 220.88
Parcomp overall 5,969 2.89 1.57 0 5
between 141 1.28 0 5
within 42.33 0.90 −0.13 5.44
Xconst overall 5,969 4.28 2.33 1 7
between 141 1.87 1 7
within 42.33 1.41 −0.96 9.00
Party bans overall 11,776 2.65 1.55 0 4
between 164 1.15 0 4
within 85.22 1.14 −1.25 6.47
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Table 5: List of Included Countries
Country Polity (min) Polity (max)
Afghanistan -10 -7
Albania -9 9
Algeria -9 2
Argentina -9 8
Armenia -6 7
Australia 10 10
Austria 10 10
Azerbaijan -7 1
Bangladesh -7 8
Belarus -7 7
Belgium 8 10
Benin -7 7
Bolivia -7 9
Botswana 6 8
Brazil -9 8
Bulgaria -7 9
Burkina Faso -7 5
Burundi -7 6
Cambodia -9 2
Cameroon -8 -4
Canada 10 10
Central African Republic -7 5
Chad -9 -2
Colombia 7 9
Comoros -7 9
Congo -8 5
Costa Rica 10 10
Cote d'Ivoire -9 4
Croatia -5 9
Cuba -7 -7
Cyprus 7 10
Czech Republic 8 10
Czechoslovakia -7 8
Democratic Republic of Congo -9 5
Denmark 10 10
Djibouti -8 2
Dominican Republic -9 8
Ecuador -5 9
Egypt -7 -3
El Salvador -6 8
Equatorial Guinea -7 2
Estonia 6 9
Ethiopia -9 -7
Fiji -4 9
Finland 10 10
France 5 9
Gabon -9 3
Gambia -7 8
Georgia 4 7
Germany 10 10
Ghana -9 8
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Greece -7 10
Guatemala -7 8
Guinea -9 5
Guinea-Bissau -8 6
Haiti -10 7
Honduras -1 7
Hungary -7 10
India 7 9
Indonesia -7 8
Iran -10 3
Ireland 10 10
Israel 9 10
Italy 10 10
Jamaica 9 10
Japan 10 10
Kazakhstan -6 -3
Kenya -7 8
Korea -9 8
Kyrgyz Republic -3 7
Laos -7 -1
Latvia 8 8
Lebanon 2 7
Lesotho -9 9
Liberia -7 6
Lithuania 10 10
Macedonia (FYROM) 6 9
Madagascar -6 9
Malawi -9 6
Malaysia 1 10
Mali -7 7
Mauritania -7 4
Mauritius 9 10
Namibia 6 6
Moldova 5 8
Mongolia -7 10
Mozambique -8 5
Myanmar (Burma) -8 8
Nepal -10 6
Netherlands 10 10
New Zealand 10 10
Nicaragua -8 9
Niger -7 8
Nigeria -7 8
North Korea -9 -8
Norway 10 10
Pakistan -7 8
Panama -8 9
Papua New Guinea 4 4
Paraguay -9 8
Peru -7 9
Philippines -9 8
Poland -8 10
Portugal -9 10
Romania -8 9
Russia 3 6
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Rwanda -7 -3
Senegal -7 8
Serbia (Yugoslavia) -7 -5
Sierra Leone -7 7
Singapore -2 7
Slovak Republic 7 10
Slovenia 10 10
Somalia -7 7
South Africa 4 9
South Yemen -8 -5
Spain -7 10
Sri Lanka 4 8
Sudan -7 7
Sweden 10 10
Switzerland 10 10
Syria -9 -2
Taiwan -8 10
Tajikistan -6 -1
Tanzania -6 -1
Thailand -7 9
Togo -7 -2
Trinidad and Tobago 8 10
Tunisia -9 -3
Turkey -5 9
Turkmenistan -9 -8
Uganda -7 7
Ukraine 5 7
United Kingdom 10 10
United States 10 10
Uruguay -8 10
Uzbekistan -9 -9
Venezuela -3 9
Yemen -6 0
Zambia -9 7
Zimbabwe -6 4
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Varying Thresholds for Competition and Constraints
To test the sensitivity of our measures of competition and constraints to varying
thresholds, we run four sets of additional regressions. In all four sets, shown in Tables
6 to 9, the ﬁrst column uses the original thresholds discussed in the article. In the ﬁrst
set, the minimum threshold for competition is raised by one unit from a Parcomp level
of 2 to 4 and we explore the eﬀect of this change on the subsample of countries below
this threshold, that is, countries that do not meet the competition threshold and in
which PBCs did not occur. Moving the threshold upward means that the sample
of countries falling below the threshold increases in size and includes an increasing
number of more competitive polities with every shift of the threshold. Given that,
the expectation is that the coeﬃcients of Election and Election*Winmargin will
gradually approach conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance. Moreover, the sign
of Election*Winmargin should turn and we should start to see a positive counter-
eﬀect as win-margins increase. This is exactly what we see in Table 6.
In the second set of regressions, the maximum threshold of constraints is lowered
from Xconst levels of 6 to 3 and we examine the eﬀect of this change on the subsample
of countries above threshold, that is, countries in which PBCs did not occur because
constraints on the executive were too high. As before, the sample size is increased
with every unit change in Xconst, adding polities with increasingly fewer constraints
on the executive to the subsample. The eﬀect should be similar to the ﬁrst set,
i.e., p-values of coeﬃcients should decrease and there should be a sign change in the
coeﬃcient of Election*Winmargin, indicating that higher win-margins and thus lower
competitiveness decrease the incumbent's incentives to manipulate the budget. Table
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7 presents evidence for such an eﬀect. The p-values on the Election coeﬃcient fall
from 0.81 to 0.45; if we take out OECD countries, the p-value in Model 4 even drops to
0.16.40 The eﬀect on the p-values of the interaction term are less linear, although it is
important to realize that increasing the minimal threshold of competition adds more
countries with higher constraint levels, whereas lowering the maximum threshold for
constraints adds increasingly uncompetitive countries. This explains why neither
Election nor Election*Winmargin reach conventional levels of signiﬁcance in Tables
6 and 7.
In the third set of regressions, we lower the minimum threshold for competition
from a Parcomp level of 3 to 1 while holding the Xconst threshold constant at 6,
and test the eﬀect of this change on the subsample of countries in between both
thresholds, that is, countries in which PBCs did occur. Doing so, we expand the
subsample by adding increasingly uncompetitive polities, which should increase the
p-values of our variables of interest and drive Election and/or Election*Winmargin
out of areas of statistical signiﬁcance. Considering the results in Table 8, this is
exactly what happens.
In the fourth set of regression, the maximum threshold for constraints is raised
from Xconst levels of 5 to 7, holding the minimum threshold of competition constant.
Again, we are interested in the eﬀect of this shift on the subsample in-between
both thresholds, expecting that such a change considerably reduces the signiﬁcance
levels of our variables of interest as more countries with higher levels of constraints
are added to the subsample. The results displayed in Table 9 clearly conﬁrm our
40Results are available upon request.
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theoretical expectation.
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Table 6: Raising the Minimum Threshold for Competition
(1) (2) (3)
Parcomp<3 Parcomp<4 Parcomp<5
Budget balance t−1 0.566∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Election −0.005 −0.004 −0.005
(0.400) (0.334) (0.123)
Election*Winmargin −0.0001 −0.00002 0.00004
(0.699) (0.837) (0.593)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.020∗ 0.008 0.004
(0.087) (0.297) (0.514)
Growth 0.036 0.045∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.019) (0.002)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.047 0.038 0.044
(0.482) (0.457) (0.363)
Rents p.c. (logged) 0.001 0.0005 0.0003
(0.174) (0.493) (0.661)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.004)
Debt service −0.0003 0.00005 0.0002
(0.662) (0.850) (0.406)
IMF 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.314) (0.234) (0.349)
Tenure 0.0001 0.00001 −0.0001
(0.744) (0.966) (0.801)
Observations 1,013 1,449 1,851
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
P-values in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Lowering the Maximum Threshold for Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Xconst>5 Xconst>4 Xconst>3 Xconst>2
Budget balance t−1 0.605∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Election 0.0003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.807) (0.658) (0.570) (0.448)
Election*Winmargin −0.0001 −0.00001 −0.00004 −0.00002
(0.154) (0.892) (0.625) (0.824)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.613) (0.880) (0.678) (0.497)
Growth 0.119∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.176∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.00001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.044)
Rents p.c. (logged) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.507) (0.402) (0.535) (0.543)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.00004 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003∗
(0.966) (0.154) (0.178) (0.069)
Debt service 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
IMF 0.002 −0.003 −0.003 0.003
(0.580) (0.397) (0.374) (0.221)
Tenure 0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0002
(0.533) (0.545) (0.478) (0.497)
Observations 1,101 1,370 1,442 1,888
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. P-values in
parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Lowering the Minimum Threshold for Competition
(1) (2) (3)
Parcomp>2 Parcomp>1 Parcomp>0
Xconst<6 Xconst<6 Xconst<6
Budget balance t−1 0.482∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Election −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.026)
Election*Winmargin 0.0003∗∗ 0.0002 0.0001
(0.016) (0.104) (0.204)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.026 0.019∗ 0.012
(0.155) (0.053) (0.160)
Growth 0.070∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.035) (0.015) (0.015)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.019 −0.008 0.035
(0.876) (0.932) (0.502)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.002 −0.001 −0.0001
(0.264) (0.646) (0.899)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.009 −0.010∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.017) (0.007)
Debt service 0.001∗∗ 0.0004 0.0001
(0.026) (0.238) (0.642)
IMF −0.002 0.0004 0.002
(0.738) (0.916) (0.325)
Tenure −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0001
(0.010) (0.389) (0.761)
Observations 511 909 1,504
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
P-values in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Raising the Maximum Threshold for Constraints
(1) (2) (3)
Xconst<6 Xconst<7 Xconst<8
Parcomp>2 Parcomp>2 Parcomp>2
Budget balance t−1 0.482∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Election −0.012∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.002
(0.006) (0.115) (0.191)
Election*Winmargin 0.0003∗∗ 0.0002∗ 0.00001
(0.016) (0.074) (0.879)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.026 0.010 0.0002
(0.155) (0.454) (0.982)
Growth 0.070∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.005) (0.0003)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.019 0.112 0.114∗∗
(0.876) (0.340) (0.029)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.002 −0.001 0.0001
(0.264) (0.466) (0.906)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.009 −0.007∗∗ −0.001
(0.108) (0.025) (0.215)
Debt service 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.031) (0.004)
IMF −0.002 −0.0001 0.001
(0.738) (0.989) (0.792)
Tenure −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.0003
(0.010) (0.022) (0.310)
Observations 511 686 1,612
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
P-values in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Triple Interaction Terms as Alternative to Sub-Samples
As an alternative to our sub-sample strategy, we also provide two models with a triple
interaction between Election, Winmargin, and Parcomp/Xconst. When including
the triple interaction with Parcomp, we only include countries with Xconst < 6;
conversely, when running the model with Xconst, we only include countries with
Parcomp > 2. Granted, this still leaves some sample restriction in place, but the
alternative  a four-way interaction term  is barely comprehensible and hardly
manageable with the limited number of observations at hand. That said, the three-
way interaction at least allows one of the two variables to range freely across all its
levels, alleviating the concern that our ﬁndings are driven by our slicing of the data
into sub-samples.
The results of this exercise are shown in Figures 4 and 5 below As three-way
interactions are best interpreted graphically, we refrain from showing the coeﬃcients
tables, which are available upon request. The graphs follow the suggestions by
Brambor et al. (2006) for three-way interaction terms. This means that signiﬁcant
interactions are shown as solid lines, whereas insigniﬁcant interactions are shown as
dotted lines. Please also note that in the case of Xconst, we only show levels 1, 2, 5,
and 7 to keep the graph manageable.
Substantively, we ﬁnd both graphs to be very much in line with the main argument
of this paper. Regarding Figure 4, the graph shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect of win-margin
on the budget balance in political systems with no or highly restrictive political
competition (Parcomp levels 1 and 2). Beyond that threshold, the marginal eﬀect
of win-margin grows in size as competition increases from levels 3 to 5, and it does
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so rather linearly, suggesting no particular non-linear eﬀect for Parcomp=3 in our
sample. As for Figure 5, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of win-margin at constraint levels
of Xconst=7 (and 6; not shown). Below that threshold, the marginal eﬀect increases
as the constraints on executive power decrease. Taken together, these substantively
identical ﬁndings suggest that our main ﬁndings are not an artefact of our sub-sample
strategy.
Figure 4: Marginal Eﬀect of Win-margin on Budget Balance, Conditional upon
Election and Parcomp
Note: Solid lines represent signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects; dotted lines insigniﬁcant ones.
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Figure 5: Marginal Eﬀect of Win-margin on Budget Balance, Conditional upon
Election and Xconst
Note: Solid lines represent signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects; dotted lines insigniﬁcant ones.
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Diﬀerent Model Speciﬁcations
To test the robustness of our ﬁndings to diﬀerent model speciﬁcation, we carry out
three kinds of modiﬁcations of our base model. First, we drop year ﬁxed eﬀects;
second, we run a model without country ﬁxed eﬀects; third, we test a random eﬀects
model. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 10 below. None of the changes
has any signiﬁcant eﬀect on our main ﬁndings.
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Table 10: Diﬀerent Model Speciﬁcations
(1) (2) (3)
Country FEs only Year FEs only Random eﬀects
Budget balance t−1 0.502∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.072) (0.026)
Election −0.011∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Election*Winmargin 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0002∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.023 0.004 0.006∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.003) (0.002)
Growth 0.073∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.024)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.050 −0.023 −0.008
(0.142) (0.038) (0.024)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.002 0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.010∗∗ −0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Debt service 0.001∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
IMF −0.0002 0.0002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Tenure −0.001∗ −0.0002 −0.00001
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Observations 511 511 458
Note: Autoregressive OLS models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Additional Control Variables
Following common practice, we add a number of additional control variables to see
whether our results withstand these modiﬁcations. More speciﬁcally, we add ur-
banization, the dependency ratio, a dummy for endogenous elections and minority
governments, as well as trade to the base model. Please note that the coeﬃcients of
the control variables in our base model are not reproduced due to a lack of space. In
the light of the results shown in Table 11, the main ﬁndings appear very robust to
these changes.
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Table 11: Additional Controls Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Budget balance t−1 0.480∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057)
Election −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Election*Winmargin 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Urbanization 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dependency ratio 0.00001 −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Endogenous elections −0.004 −0.006 −0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Minority government 0.005 0.003
(0.011) (0.011)
Trade −0.0002
(0.0002)
Observations 511 511 487 481 481
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Constant, FE coeﬃcients, and standard controls omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Presidential Elections Only
Since our measure of competitiveness, that is, past win-margins, might be inconsis-
tent across legislative elections due to diﬀerent voting systems (FPTP vs. propor-
tional), we rerun our base model with presidential elections only. All substantive
ﬁndings remain unchanged (see Table 12).
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Table 12: Presidential Elections Only
Budget balance t−1 0.483∗∗∗
(0.069)
Election −0.010∗∗∗
(0.004)
Election*Winmargin 0.0002∗
(0.0001)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.027
(0.019)
Growth 0.071∗∗
(0.034)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.018
(0.119)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.002
(0.001)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.009
(0.006)
Debt service 0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
IMF −0.002
(0.006)
Tenure −0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Observations 511
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Continuous Measure of Winmargin
We also test a continuous measure of win-margin where we carry the past win-margin
forward until the year of the next election. Theoretically, electoral competitiveness
should have no eﬀect on budget deﬁcits outside the context of impending elections.
We therefore expect the non-interacted base term of Winmargin to be statistically
insigniﬁcant, while the interacted part should remain signiﬁcant. The results shown
in Table 13 below conﬁrm our expectations.
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Table 13: Table 12: Continuous Measure of Winmargin
Budget balance t−1 0.484∗∗∗
(0.068)
Election −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
Winmargin 0.0001
(0.0001)
Election*Winmargin 0.0003∗∗
(0.0001)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.024
(0.018)
Growth 0.071∗∗
(0.033)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.024
(0.117)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.001
(0.001)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.009∗
(0.005)
Debt service 0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
IMF −0.002
(0.006)
Tenure −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001)
Observations 510
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Excluding Founding Elections
Recall that we coded Winmargin=0 in the case of founding elections and elections
after an autocractic interlude. This was motivated by the assumption that in these
elections incumbents have very little information to gauge their re-election prospect
and are thus particularly insecure. However, we acknowledge that this is consequen-
tial choice and we therefore rerun our regression without these founding elections.
In view of the results shown in Table 14, it is safe to say that our ﬁndings are not
driven by our coding choice.
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Table 14: Model without Founding Elections
Budget balance t−1 0.473∗∗∗
(0.062)
Election −0.008∗∗
(0.003)
Election*Winmargin 0.0002∗
(0.0001)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.013
(0.016)
Growth 0.063∗∗
(0.030)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.150
(0.104)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.0005
(0.001)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.009∗
(0.005)
Debt service 0.001∗∗
(0.0002)
IMF −0.004
(0.005)
Tenure −0.001∗∗
(0.0004)
Observations 497
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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First-round Win-margins for Presidential Elections
As an additional robustness test, we use the the ﬁrst-round results of presiden-
tial elections instead of the second round whenever elections comprised two rounds.
Whenever the later winner was not the leading candidate and the win-margin would
thus be negative, we set code it as 0. Results are available in Table 15 and are robust
to this alternative coding of presidential elections.
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Table 15: Model with First-round Presidential Elections Win-margin
Budget balance t−1 0.482∗∗∗
(0.068)
Election −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
Election*Winmargin 0.0003∗∗
(0.0001)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.027
(0.019)
Growth 0.070∗∗
(0.033)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.018
(0.119)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.001
(0.001)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.009
(0.006)
Debt service 0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
IMF −0.002
(0.006)
Tenure −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001)
Observations 511
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Alternative Indicator for Parcomp
Although we found no evidence for non-linear eﬀects of Parcomp in a previous ro-
bustness tests, we acknowledge that the coding of Parcomp=3 as factional party
competition is qualitatively diﬀerent from the other levels of the variable. We
therefore replicate our model using Party bans as an alternative indicator for po-
litical competition. Taken from Coppedge et al. (2015), the variable measures the
extent to which political parties are banned and, by extension, political competition
is restricted. Using this variable, we rerun our model excluding countries in which
opposition parties are completely, frequently, or sometimes banned (Party bans <4).
The results are shown in Table 16 are substantively very similar to our standard
estimates using Parcomp.
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Table 16: Alternative Indicator for Parcomp: Party Bans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party bans<4 Party bans<4 Xconst>5 Xconst>5 Party bans>3 Party bans>3
Xconst<6 Xconst<6
Budget balance t−1 0.587∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.066) (0.066) (0.077) (0.077)
Election −0.006 −0.004 −0.001 0.0003 −0.004 −0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Election*Winmargin −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0002∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Growth 0.041∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.026 0.025 0.178∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.063 0.065
(0.066) (0.066) (0.040) (0.039) (0.107) (0.106)
Rents p.c. (logged) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.00004 −0.008∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Debt service −0.0002 −0.0002 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
IMF 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Tenure −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 −0.001∗ −0.001∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 1,026 1,026 1,101 1,101 553 553
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Constant and FE coeﬃcients omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Win-margin Volatility
Given that the nature of political competition and, by extension, the quality of
democracy can change over time, past win-margins might not always be a good
indicator of competitiveness. Such reversals would entail distorting ﬂuctuations of
win-margins with narrow, competitive margins being followed by large margins as a
result of less competitive elections. We respond to this challenge in two ways: ﬁrst,
descriptively Figures 6 and 7 suggest that there are no particularly pronounced ﬂuc-
tuations in the win-margins. Figure 7 shows that the vast majority of win-margins
changes  that is, the diﬀerence between the previous election's win-margin and the
current election's win-maring  are small, suggesting high levels of competitiveness.
Moreover, when analysing the win-margin changes greater than one standard devia-
tion (+/- 25 percent), we ﬁnd that 50 percent of these changes occur in regimes with
Polity scores of 5 and higher on a scale ranging from -10 to 10; 75 percent of these
big changes occur in regimes with a Polity score of -2 or higher. Taken together,
the descriptive pattern shows a relatively smooth trend of win-margins over time,
and those cases in which big win-margin shift occur are mostly on the democratic
side of the political spectrum.
Second, we further test the robustness of our ﬁndings to win-margin volatility
by excluding elections with win-margin changes greater than one standard deviation
from the regression. The results of is restricted model, detailed in Table 17, show a
weaker, yet substantively similar pattern to our previous ﬁndings.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Winmargin
Figure 7: Distribution of Change of Winmargin
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Table 17: Model without Big Win-Margin Changes
Budget balance t−1 0.491∗∗∗
(0.068)
Election −0.008∗
(0.005)
Election*Winmargin 0.0003∗
(0.0002)
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.013
(0.016)
Growth 0.074∗∗∗
(0.027)
Tax revenues/GDP 0.125
(0.119)
Rents p.c. (logged) −0.001
(0.001)
Aid p.c. (logged) −0.009∗
(0.005)
Debt service 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002)
IMF −0.002
(0.005)
Tenure −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0005)
Observations 471
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant and FE coeﬃcients
omitted from table.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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